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Summary  findings
Fiscal adjustment is an illusion when it lowers the budget  accumulation), the government will respond by lowering
deficit or public debt but leaves the governmient's net  its asset accumulation or by increasing hidden liabilities.
worth unchanged, says Easterly.  That leaves net worth unchanged, so fiscal adjustment is
Conventional measures of the budget deficit largely  an illusion.
measure the change in explicit public sector liabilities  He performs some simple empirical tests on the
(debt). A more appropriate measure or the deficit would  observational predictions of the model, examining a
be the change in public sector net worth, but many  sample of countries with World Bank and International
criticize this concept as impossible to measure.  Monetary Fund adjustment programs and case studies of
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When is fiscal adjustment  an illusion?
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Paper presented  at the 27th Panel Meeting  of Economic Polky in Vienna,  October 16-17,  1998.  I am grateful  for
comments  from  Alberto  Alesina,  David  Begg,  Jakob de Haan, Jordi Galh,  Estelle James, George  Kopits, Ross Levine,
Lant Pritchett, Luis Serven,  two anonymous  referees,  and from  participants  in seminars  at the World  Bank,  Atlanta
Federal Reserve,  governments  of Colombia,  Ecuador,  and Venezuela,  and in the Economic  Policy  Panel Meeting.2
Fiscal adjustment  is an illusion  when  it lowers  the budget  deficit  or public debt  but leaves
govermment  net worth  unchanged.  Conventional  measures  of  the deficit  mostly  capture  the change
in explicit  government  liabilities  (debt),  and mostly  do not capture  the change  in government  assets
or the change  in implicit  liabilities.  A more appropriate  measure  of the deficit  would  be the change
in public sector's assets  minus  all its liabilities,  or the change  in its net worth.
IMF/World  Bank adjustment  programs  often  require  reducing  the conventional  deficit,  as
do legal agreements  like Gramm-Rudman  and Maastricht. This paper shows  that, under certain
plausible  conditions,  a govermment  will lower  the conventional  deficit  while  leaving  its path of net
worth  uanchanged.  When  required  to lower  its debt  accumulation,  the government  will  lower its
asset accumulation  or increase  its hidden  liability  accumulation  by an equal  amount.  In such  a
case,  fiscal adjustment  is an illusion.'  I investigate  the empirical  implications  of this positive
prediction,  and find  that results already  known  in the literature  as well  as additional  results in tiis
paper confirm  it. While  existing  data are inadequate  to test whether  fiscal adjustment  was
completely  illusory,  the support  for the predictions  of the model  indicates  that adjustment  was at
least  in part an illusion.
1. Literature review and anecdotes
Economists  have  widely  accepted  the "change  in net worth"  definition  of the deficit  as the
right  conceptual  measure  (Ott and Yoo 1980,  Buiter 1983, 1985, 1993,  Blejer  and Cheasty  1993,
Bohn 1992,  Eisner 1984, 1986,  1990).  While  not all of these  authors  have  the same  definition  of
net worth  in mind,  all agree  that the general  concept  of change  in net worth is the appropriate
definition  for the deficit.  Eisner  and Pieper  1984  estimate  that US consolidated  government  debt
increased  by $1 trillion  from 1946  to 1980.  However,  they also estimate  that total consoLidated
government  assets increased  by $3 trillion  from 1946  to 1980,  so net worth  increased  by $2
trillion.  However,  it is difficult  to carry out such calculations  in very many  countries,  especially3
poor countries.  As Blejer  and Cheasty  1991  note,  "defining  government  net  worth ... is far from
operational." 2
But what is difficult  to measure  operationally  is still  relevant  for predicting  how  the
government  will  behave.  The  relevant  concept  for government  intertemporal  behavior  is net worth,
as this paper  will show.  Then  governments  will follow  its optinal path of net  worth and be
indifferent  about  its composition  between  assets, explicit  liabilities,  and implicit  liabilities.  If an
outside  agent  constrains  increases  in explicit  liabilities,  then  the government  will substitute
reductions  in assets  and increases  in implicit  liabilities.  Here I go through anecdotal  evidence  and
previous  results in the literature  to establish  this claim,  while  I will go through  more formal
theorizing  and testing  below.
The  most transparent  means  of reducing  government  assets is privatization. 3 Privatization
often  makes  possible  significant  efficiency  gains, but something  is amiss when  governments
develop  a sudden  interest  in privatization  during  fiscal  austerity.  Nigeria  over 1989-93  had 2 IMF
stand-by  agreements  and 2 World  Bank adjustment  loans that placed  constraints  on its budget
deficit  and public debt.  During  that period  it sold  government  equity  shares  in upstream  oil
ventures  for US$2.5  billion. This was during  the Persian  Gulf  War oil boom,  a period  in which a
government  commission  found  that $12.2 billion  of oil money  had disappeared. 4 Privatization  by a
corrupt  government  is likely  to end  up in consumption  by the ruling  class, thus lowering  public
sector  net worth.
Developing  countries  are not the only  ones  to privatize  during  austerity.  The government
counted  privatization  receipts  towards  reducing  the deficit  in the US during  its experiment  with a
fiscal rule, the Gramm-Rudman-Holngs  Law of 1985.5  Kotlikoff  (1986)  quotes  the director  of the
US Congressional  Budget  Office  as saying  "The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  process  ... has
encouraged  ... transparent  budget  gimmickry"  such  as  "sale  of public  assets."  Niskanen  (1988,  p.
59) describes  how  Congress  stalled  on privatization  of the railway  company  Conrail  until Gramm-4
Rudman  created  incentives  for privatization  to meet budget  targets. The Congressional  Budget
Plan to meet Gramm-Rudman  targets in FY1987  included  $7 billion  of asset sales, such as sales of
rural  housing  and development  loans. 6 The plan  also induced  prepayment  of rural electrification
loans (counted  as revenue)  by eliminating  prepayment  penalties  -- even  though  that worsened
government  net worth  by losing  assets  that paid interest  rates above  current  market  rates.7  During
the Gramnm-Rudman  era, the President  or Congress  proposed  at various  times selling  off the
Federal  Housing  Administration,  Amtrak,  the naval  petroleum  reserves,  and five  power marketing
administrations. 8
Another  well-known  means  of reducing  asset accumulation  when  forced  to reduce  debt
accumulation  is to reduce  public  investment. 9 As Roubini  and Sachs 1989  note, "in periods  of
restrictive  fiscal policies  ... capital  expenditures  are  the first to be reduced  (often  drastically)."
During  fiscal  adjustment,  the 1988  World  Development  Report (p. 113)  of the World  Bank found
that governments  cut capital spending  by far more  (about  35%)  than other  public sector  categories
like wages  (about 10%).  Likewise,  Hicks  (1991)  found  that in countries  with declining  government
expenditure  70-84,  governments  cut capital  expenditures  by more (-27.8  percent)  than current
expenditures  (-7.2 percent).  Serven  1997  found  that Latin American  public investment  fell 2.5
percentage  points of GDP  from the 70s  to the 80s, when  the region  was adjusting.  East Asia, which
did not need  to adjust  in the 80s, had an increase  of 3.7 percentage  points. The  World  Bank
(1994d)  found  that when  African  countries  lowered  their  budget  deficits  from 1981-86  to 1990-91,
"most of the cuts were in capital spending"  (p. 47). De Haan et al.(1996)  find  that public
investment  is reduced  during  times of fiscal stringency  in OECD  countries.
While  public investment  contains  "white  elephants",  it also contains  investment  that will
pay the government  future  returns.  The  World  Bank (1994a, p. 17)  estimated  rates  of return  to
infrastructure  investment  during 1983-92  ranging  from 19  percent  (telecommunications)  to 29
percent (highways).  And even  some  state enterprise  investments  are profitable.  In Zambia,  for5
example,  the government  withdrew  money  from the state copper  company  ZCCM to meet deficit
targets instead  of profitable  reinvestment  in the company. In part because  of this disinvestment  in
copper,  ZCCM saw  production  fai from 700,000  tons a year  in 1972  to 300,000  tons in the
1990s.  Revenue  from mining  fell from 10.8  percent  of GDP in 1970-74  to 1.6 percent  of GDP in
1990-94  (World  Bank 1996a,  WestAfrica, 24 February-March  2 1997).  Likewise  in Zaire,
mineral  production  by the state company  GECAMINES  feel from 500,000  tons in 1988-89  to just
over 40,000  tons in 1994-95.  It contribution  to the government  budget  feUl  from $325 million  in
1988-89  to zero in 1992-94.  Among  factors  leading  to GECAMNES collapse  was "insufficient
investment,  which  led to the obsolescence  and decay  of equipment  and the cave-in  of a major
mining  site (Kamoto  mine)  in 1990."  (International  Monetary  Fund 1996b)  The  US government
held  up investment  for airport  expansion  in the 1980s  so as to meet Gramm-Rudman  targets, even
though  the expansions  paid  for themselves  through  the 8 percent  tax on airline  tickets.  10
A third  means  of reducing  asset accumulation  is to reduce  operations  and maintenance
(O&M)  spending.  Spending  cuts in the US to meet  Graunm-Rudman  targets in the 1980s  "fell
heavily  on ... operations  and maintenance"  (Deloup  et al. 1987).  The  World  Bank 1994a  noted  that
inadequate  spending  on O&M  during  fiscal adjustment  reduces  current  asset values  and/or  requires
future spending  to restore  those assets:
Timely  maintenance  of  $12  billion  would  have  saved  road  reconstruction  costs  of $45  billion  in Africa  in
the  past decade.  On  average,  inadequate  maintenance  means  that  power  systens  in developing  countnes
have  only  60  percent  of  their  generating  capacity  available  at a given  time,  whereas  best practice  would
achieve  levels  over  80  percent.  And  it means  that  water  supply  systems  deliver  an average  of 70 percent  of
their  output  to users,  compared  with  best-practice  delivery  rates  of 85  percent.  (p.4)
In the Philippines,  the World  Bank 1992a  found  that budget  stringencies  during 1983-85  resulted
in large cuts (about  40 percent)  in O&M  expenditures.  The  result  was deteriorating  roads,  bridges,
ports, and increased  breakdowns  at power  plants  during  the late 1980s.  Likewise,  the same  study
found  that Costa Rica cut O&M  by 80 percent  during  fiscal adjustmnent  in the 1980s.  By the end of
the period,  70 percent  of the road network  was in poor to very  poor condition.  Kenyan  hospitals'6
incubators  operated  for two years instead  of the eight  expected.  Maintenance  budgets  in these
hospitals  were only 1 percent  of the machinery's  value  when  the optimal  is 10 percent  (World  Bank
1993a,  p. 138).  In the period  that Kenya  received  19  adjustment  loans (1979-96),  it reduced
spending  on operations  and maintenance  and other  goods  spending  from 160 percent  of wages
spendling  to 75 percent  of wages  spending.
Gyamfi  (1992)  estimates  economic  rates  of return  of over 70 percent  for operations  and
maintenance  on roads in Latin America.  World  Bank 1992a (p.57)  estimated  a rate of return of
117  percent  for nonwage  operations  and maintenance  in irrigation  in mid-80s  Indonesia.  Hospitals,
roads,  power,  irrigation,  and water  supply  are all publicly  provided  goods  for which  it is fairly  easy
to recoup  costs.  The government  can  use excise  taxes (for roads, on fuel and vehicles)  or user
charges  (for hospitals,  power,  irrigation,  and water).  So allowing  these assets  to deteriorate  hurts
future  government  revenue  potential.
Cuts in O&M  spending  simply  postpone  ifriastructure  spending  towards  the future.  This
is onlty  one of many  ways  that governments  can protect  public  consumption  today by shifting  other
expenditures  and revenues  across  time to meet  today's cash deficit  targets." 1 Brazil in 1998  issued
zero  coupon  government  bonds  that were not due until  the next  year,  thus lowering  this year's
interest  expenditure.  Many  govemrnents  resort  to the expedient  of delaying  payments  to
government  workers  or suppliers. These  arrears  lower  this year's cash deficit  and explicit  debt,
but the accrual-based  net worth  balance  is unchanged. 1 2
In an unusual  twist, the US Congress  broughtforward  by five  days a $680  million
payment  of federal  revenue-sharing  payments  into  FY1986  so as to meet  the Gramm-Rudman
targets for FY1987  (Wildavsky  1992,  pp. 24344). Using  a more  traditional  device,  the Congress
in FY1987  postponed  a $3 billion  payday  for military  personnel  into  the following  fiscal  year. The
Defense  Secretary  Caspar Weinberger  also stretched  out procurement  of new weapons  system  so
as to lower  the current  expenditure,  even  though  the stretch-out  increased  per unit costs (Kee 1987,7
p. 11).  The Gramm-Rudman  annual  cash  targets encouraged  switching  to projects  that disburse
slowly,  so as to meet  this year's target whatever  the long-run  costs of the project (Hanushek  1986).
Governments  can also shift  taxes over  time. There  are many  anecdotes  of developing
countries  getting  advance  payments  of taxes to meet IMF program  deficit  targets (Kopits  and Craig
1998).  The  US Congress  moved  about  $1 billion  in excise  tax collections  forward  to meet Gramm-
Rudman  deficit  ceiling  in FYI987. 1 3 The literature  on balanced  budget  requirements  in US states
notes:  "a state usually  has considerable  latitude  to accelerate  tax collections,  defer  outlays,  and
adopt accounting  practices  that avert a deficit."' 4
Another  type of expenditure  postponement  is to delay  addressing  financial  crises in banks
where  the government  has an implicit  or explicit  deposit  guarantee.  As the government  postpones
shutting  the banks  and writing  off loan  losses  so as not to incur  expenditure  today,  there is
incentive  for the banks  to continue  making  bad loans. This adds  to the government's  obligatory
bailout spending  in the future. In the US, the government  during  the Gramm-Rudman  era
postponed  for 5 years dealing  with the savings  and loan  crisis. The result  was that the cost of the
eventual  bailout  rose from $25  billion  to $200  billion  (Kotlikoff  1993).  Similar  episodes  of costly
delay  occurred  in developing  countries  (see  Brock (1992)  for the example  of Chile). The size  of
necessary  banking  bailouts  in the countries  suffering  from the 1997-98  East Asia crisis is estimated
to range  from 20 to 60 percent  of GDP." 5
Another  intertemporal  sleight  of hand is when  governments  require  their pension  funds
(that accumulate  surpluses  early in the life-cycle  of the plan)  to lend  to the government  at negative
real interest  rates.  Examples  include  Costa  Rica, Ecuador,  Egypt,  Jamaica,  Peru, Trinidad  and
Tobago,  Turkey,  and Venezuela.  In the worst case,  Peru, the real return on the pension  fund was -
37.4 percent.  Lower  interest  rates on government  debt  reduce  the budget  deficit,  but also reduce  the
reserves  available  when  the pension  plan begins  to run deficits  later in its life cycle. 16 The8
government  will  have  to honor  the net pension  liabilities,  so  the negative  real interest  rate scheme
just redistributes  spending  across  time (World  Bank 1994b,  p. 128).
Unfunded  pension  liabilities  are themselves  a form of hidden  liability  accumulation.  The
surplus  of a young  pay-as-you-go  pension  system  often  directly  reduces  the budget  deficit.
However,  the net present  value of the contribution  and benefit  scheme  in place is often  negative. 17
For example,  Turkey,  Colombia,  China,  and Argentina  have a negative  net present  value of their
pension  plans equal  to more  than a third of GDP (World  Bank 1994b). Kane and Palacios 1996
estimate  the present  value of accrued  claims  by workers  and pensioners  in Brazil, Croatia,
Hungary,  Ukraine,  and Uruguay  to be 2-3 times GDP."'
Kopits  and Symansky  1998  are on the  mark about  fiscal rules without  fiscal  transparency:
Compliance  with  fiscal  rules has led to ... cuts in public  investment  ... accumulation  of payment
arrears,  proliferation  of creative  accounting  practices  and recourse  to one-off  measures  (such  as financing
from  privatization  receipts).  (p. 12)
2. A positive  theory of government intertemporal  behavior
This section  proposes  an extremely  simple  and highly  abstract model  of the government's
behavior. 19 I assume  that the government  is a single  agent  who  maximizes  its own  utility.  Examples
are a dictator,  an oligarchy  with common  preferences,  or an elected  leader  with power  over the
budget. I assume  that the government  derives  utility  from "consumption"  in an analogous  way to
how  private individuals  derive  utility  from consumption.  "Consumption"  for a government  may be
the leader's own  individual  consumption  of public  resources,  or it may be patronage  to political
supporters  embodied  in current  government  spending.  The  government's  intertemporal  optimization
problem  is then  just like  that of an infinitely  lived  individual  consumer,  maximizing  the present
value of future  utility  (assuming  log utility),  subject  to a budget  constraint:
(1) mrax  fo- e-'tIn C dt
such  that
(2) C= rA - rLe  - rLi - AA  + ALe +  ALi9
and
(3) A-LeLi 2 fo-  C-rt Ct dt
Here C is govemment  consumption,  A is the valuation  of the govermnent's  assets,  L. is explicit
government  debt,  Li is implicit  govermment  liabilities,  r is both the rate of return  on govenmment
assets  and the interest  rate on govermment  liabilities,  and p is the govenmment's  discount  rate. The
government  finances  its current  consumption  with asset income  minus debt  interest,  asset
decumulation,  debt accumulation,  and hidden  liability  accumulation.  The last condition  (3) is the
government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint:  net worth  must be greater  than or equal  to the
present  value of all future  consumption.  Since  the latter is certainly  positive,  net worth must
always  be positive.  If net worth  threatens  to become  negative,  then an insolvent  government  would
default  on its liabilities.
The definition  of government  assets, as noted  by earlier  authors,  should  be broad. As
Buiter  (1993)  and Blejer  and Cheasty  (1993)  define  government  assets, it should  include  the
present  value  of tax revenues  and social  security  contributions,  government-owned  physical
capital,  equity  in state-owned  enterprises,  land,  mineral  assets, and the present  value of seignorage
from  money  creation.
I assume  that the government  has an infinite  supply  of potential  projects  with a financial
rate of return  equal  to r, which  is also the market  interest  rate. I take the interest  rate r as given.  I
define  these "projects"  as broadly  as government  assets.  They  could  include  anything  from
upgrading  of the tax collection  system  to the construction  of a road that generates  increased  traffic
(and thus increased  vehicle  and fuel  excise  taxation).
The stream  of "revenues"  accruing  from a project should  be the government's  own  returns
not the  total returns  to the whole  society.  However,  there are at least three reasons  why  the
govenmment  may reap a rate of return  of r even  if user fees are not being  imposed.10
First, the govemment  taxes income  and retail  sales and so would  get  at least the tax rate
times  the project benefits  to the rest of society.  This suggests  that the govermnent  will select
projects  with a social  return  r, at a tax rate t such  that r:t* r8.
Second,  we should  base the present  value  of project revenue  on the potential  user fees, not
the current  ones.  The  potential  for charging  user fees raises the government's  long run revenue
potential,  which  is what matters  in the government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint.  Failure  to
charge  user fees is a subsidy  and we should  include  that subsidy  in consumption.
Third,  infrastructure  investment  is an important  determinant  of the size  of the formal
sector,  which  is the main  tax base for the government.  Sachs  (1994)  suggests  there are multiple
equilibria:  one in which  most firms  are in the formal  sector,  pay taxes, and benefit  from public
goods,  and one  in which  firms go underground,  do not pay taxes, and do not benefit  from public
goods.  Fiscal  adjustment  that exogenously  shifts  down  the provision  of public  goods  could  set off
the vicious  circle,  with calamitous  effects  on revenues  (see  Zaire case  study  below).
After all this, what is the solution  to the govermment's  intertemporal  problem  (1) -(3)?
The solution  is the familiar  Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans  first-order  condition:
(4) AC/C = r - p
In the government's  steady  state, net worth  and consumption  will  grow at the same  rate:
(5) (AA - AL. - ALi  )/(A-L-L 1) = r - p
By substituting  (5) into (2), we can also solve  for the ratio of net worth  to consumption:
(6) (A-L.-L 1)/C = I/p
The "true"  balance  of the government  (the  change  in net worth)  as a ratio to consumption  will  be
(7) (AA- AL. - ALWC -=rIp  -1
There  are three things  to note about  the solution  of the government's  intertemporal
problem.  First, the discount  rate p is a useful indicator  of "fiscal  irresponsibility".  A fiscally11
irresponsible  government  (high  p) will  value consumption  today  very highly  relative  to future
consumption. 20 This will  result  in a lower (possibly  negative)  "true"  government  balance  as a ratio
to consumption.  It also means  a lower  net worth  to consumption  ratio. A fiscally  irresponsible
government  will  be one in which  in steady  state  there is under-provision  of profitable  public capital
services,  an excessive  debt ratio, and excessive  implicit  liabilities.
Second,  even  though  the level  of net worth  must be positive  if there  is to be positive
government  consumption,  note  that the growth  of government  net worth can  be negative  if the
government's  discount  rate p is greater  than  the interest  rate r. In this pathological  case,  the
government  will disinvest  in its revenue  capacity  and infrastructure  so much  that the state slowly
withers  away.  This might  explain  a case  like Zaire,  where  the formal  sector  disintegrated  due to the
failure  to provide  elementary  infastructure. Tax revenue  collapsed  from 30 percent  of GDP  in
1973  to under 5 percent  by the 1990s.  By 1994,  the state  had shriveled  to little  more  than the
presidential  yacht,  a presidential  guard unit, Mobutu's  palace  in his birthplace  of Gbadolite,  and a
skeleton  state superstructure  funded  by diamond  smuggling  (Young  1994).
The third  thing  to note  is that while  the path of net worth  A-Le-Li  is determined  by the
model,  the composition  of A-Le-Li  between  A, Le  and LI is indeterminate.  The  government  is
indifferent  to whether  it finances  consumption  today  by running  down  assets or by piling  up
explicit  or implicit  liabilities.  A, Le,  and L, are not economically  meaningful  categories  in this case:
we could  call liabilities  "negative  assets" and sum  everything  up under net assets.  It is only when
an outside  party constrains  L. alone  that the A and L, versus  Le  distinction  becomes  economically
meaningful.
How does  this model  relate  to conventional  measures  of the budget  deficit? The
conventional  budget  deficit  D measures  the sum  of consumption  (C), interest  expenditure  (rL.), the12
current  realization  of implicit  liabilities  (rL 1) and investment  expenditure  (AA)  minus  income  (rA)
and the current  proceeds  of implicit  liabilities  ALi  (such  as social security  contributions):
(8) D =  C + rLe + rL1 + AA - rA  - ALi
Comparing  (8) with the  budget  constraint  (2), we see  that the conventional  definition  of a deficit
(the  Public  Sector  Borrowing  Requirement  or PSBR) measures  only  the change  in explicit
liabilities: 21
(9) D -=  ALe.
The usual excuse  for measuring  only  the change  in explicit  liabilities  is that net worth  is
impossible  to calculate. 22 However,  what is different  to measure  operationally  is still relevant  to
the government's  behavior.  A fiscally  irresponsible  government  can frustrate  any attempt  to control
its finances  through  constraints  on the conventional  budget  deficit.
Let us say an outside  agent  -- the Gramm-Rudman  Law, the European  Commission,  or a
Fund/Bank  adjustment  program  -- puts a limit on D. To make it consistent  with growth  in the
steady  state, let's imagine  that the ratio of D to consumption  C is constrained  to be equal  to  A. If
ALJC=  A, then we can solve  for AA/C  - ALXC:
(9) AA/C  -ALi/C  = r /p -1 + A
Any  nmandated  reduction  in the deficit  as a percent  of consumption  (A) will  be met one for one  with
a reduction  in asset accumulation  as a percent  of consumption  (AA/C)  or accumulation  of hidden
liabilities  AL,/C. Similarly,  the stock equation  (6) shows  that any mandated  reduction  in public
debt  will be met  one for one by a reduction  in public  assets or an increase  in hidden  liabilities.  In
these cases, fiscal  adjustment  is an illusion.3 The  fiscal adjustment  is genuine  only  when  the
government  has a change  of heart, i.e. has a lower  discount  rate p.
A, Le  and L, are metaphors  for the diverse  ways  that governments  can shift  revenues  and
expenditures  over time. For example,  government  during  a fiscal  adjustment  can  postpone13
expenditure  or it can require  advance  payment  of taxes. The improvement  in the cash deficit  due to
this postponement  is illusory.  These  kinds  of fiscal  tricks will  show  up as a later reversal  of the
progress  made  on the deficit.
Thus although  the net worth  budget  deficit  is difficult  to measure  operationally,  a model  of
government  behavior  based on the net worth  budget  deficit  has some  clear predictions.  This model
predicts  that, barring  any change  in the discount  rate of the governments  concerned,  the
govermnents  will respond  to a mandated  deficit  reduction  by: (1) cutting  public investment,  (2)
privatization,  (3) shifting  revenue  and expenditure  over  time, or (4) running  up implicit  liabilities.
Note that these  mechanisms  will  allow  the path of government  consumption  to remain  unchanged.
The intuition  is very simple  -- a fiscally  irresponsible  government  wants  to have  high
present  consumption  at the expense  of lower  future  benefits. If that government  is constrained  in
only  one form of shifting  revenue  and expenditure  across time (public  debt),  it will  find other  ways
of shifting  revenue  and expenditure  across  time so as to leave its high  present  consumption
unchanged.
3. Testing  the predictions  of the model  on developing  country  adjusters.
This section  tests the positive  predictions  of the above  model.  I will  look successively  at
government  consumption,  public  investment,  privatization,  and revenue  and expenditure  shifing
over time.
3.1 Government  consumption
The most direct  prediction  of the model  is that government  consumption  growth  will  be the
same  during  adjustment  programs  as it is outside  of adjustment  programs. I test this by comparing
the median  real growdi  of government  consumption  during  IMF stand-by  arrangements  to the
median  real growth  for the whole  sample  period  for each  country.  I have  a sample  of 89 countries
that received  one or more  stand-by  loans during  the period 1967-96.  1 have  real government
consumption  for the same  period  from country  national  accounts. Since  the prediction  of the model14
has to do with long-run  optimization,  I first apply  the Hodrick-Prescott  filter to get the long-run
component  of government  consumption  in each country  (although  results  without  this filter are the
same). I then  compare  the growth  of permanent  government  consumption  in stand-by  and non-
standby  periods.  I find  that long-run  government  consumption  was lower  during stand-bys  in 44 of
the 89 country  cases.  We would  have expected  half  the cases  to be below  average  government
consumption  growth  and half above  if the growth  of government  consumption  were unrelated  to
stand-bys.  Hence,  we fail to reject  the hypothesis  that consumption  growth  is the same  during
stand-bys  as during  non-stand-by  periods.
3.2 Public  Investment
In this section,  I construct  a new series on public  investment  and World Bank/IMF
adjustment  lending.  I then test the proposition  that adjustment  programs  -- as enforced  by IMF and
World  Bank adjustment  loans  -- generally  are accompanied  by public  investment  reductions.  Public
investxment  series  are difficult  to obtain,  because  the data on public  investment  made  by public
enterprises  are not reported  to the standard  international  data sources  (such  as the Government
Finance  Statistics  of the IMF), although  they are counted  in the deficit  for adjustment  loan
conditionality.  My public  investment  series  for this paper amalgamates  5 different  efforts  to get
public  investment  data from internal  IMF and World  Bank reports:  (1) the series on public
investment  by country  1970-89  by Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993),  (2) the public  investment  series
constructed  for the 1991  World  Development  Report  (World  Bank 1991),  (3) the series  on public
and private  investment  constructed  by the International  Finance  Corporation  of the World  Bank
(Pfeffermann  and Madarassy  1993  and subsequent  updates),  (4) a recent effort  to assemble  public
investment  statistics  by the Macroeconomic  Data Team  of the World  Bank,  and (5) the United
Nations  National  Accounts.  I take the simple  average  of whatever  series  are available  for each  year
for each  country.15
I study  the behavior  of public investment  in a special  set of countries  whose  deficits  were
likely  constrained  by outside  forces -- those  countries  receiving  World  Bank  and IMF adjustment
loans. I construct  a database  of total number  of adjustment  loans by country. 24 Adjustment  lending
began  at the Bank in 1980  and IMF operations  increased  at the same  time, so the number  of total
adjustment  loans of all kinds accelerated  sharply  in the 1980s.  This  justifies  using  the post-1980
period  as the era of adjustment  lending.  The Bank and Fund  gave adjustrnent  loans  to induce  policy
changes  in the recipient.  One of the most important  policy  changes  the Bank and Fund sought  was
a budget  deficit  reduction.  This condition  was observed  in most cases. An IMF study  notes that
budget  deficits  fell  by 4 percentage  points of GDP  during  the average  two and a half year long  IMF
program  (Schadler  et al 1995,  p. 19).  Likewise,  a World  Bank  study (World  Bank 1996c,  p. 33)
found  that targets for budget  deficits  were  attained  in a majority  of countries  receiving  Bank
adjustment  loans.  Hence,  countries  receiving  adjustment  loans during  this period  had their deficits
constrained.
I have a database  of 15 countries  that received  ten or more  World  Bank and IMF
adjustment  loans and that have  complete  data on public investment  for 1980-1994.  2  The prediction
of the model  is that countries  will  reduce  asset accumulation  at the same  time as the IFIs constrain
them  to reduce  debt accumulation  (the  public  deficit).  I take public investment  as an imperfect
proxy for asset accumulation  - even  if it includes  some "white  elephants,"  it also includes  valuable
state assets like  infiastructure.  Public  investment  decreased  steadily  during 1980-94  in these 15
intensively  adjusting  countries  (Figure 1).
By way of contrast,  Figure  2 shows  the public  investment  behavior  of the EasT  Asian  high
growth  countries  (prior  to their recent debacle). They  did not need  to adjust  in the 1980s  and early
90s, and so we see no general  tendency  for public  investment  to decline  in these  countries. Hong
Kong  has a mild negative  trend,  China  a strong  positive  trend, and  the others  go up and down  with
no clear trend.2616
3.3 Privatization  and other  asset sales
The  most transparent  form of asset decumulation  is privatization  of valuable  state assets.
Privatization  usually  involves  two separate  operations  - the commercialization  of a politically  run
state enterprise  and the sale  of this enterprise  for cash. The first implies  important  efficiency
gains;  the second  should  not be done  for fiscal reasons,  e.g.  to finance  government  consumption.
However,  my model  predicts  that a constraint  on debt  will motivate  privatization  to maintain
government  consumption.
To test this hypothesis,  I look  at the association  between  privatization  revenues  as a
percent of GDP and Fund-Bank  adjustment  loans over 1988-95.  Fund-Bank  loans implied  a
constraint  on public debt.  There  is a positive  and significant  correlation,  with each additional  loan
associated  with .25 percentage  points of GDP more  privatization  revenue  (t-statistic  of 2.26).
While  privatization  may have  been  a condition  of some  of these  loans,  this association  is also
consistent  with  the model  prediction  that governments  forced  to reduce  liabilities  will reduce  assets.
Privatization  revenues  are not supposed  to reduce  the deficit  directly  according  to IMF accounting
methodology,  but they can be used  to reduce  gross public  debt  to meet debt  targets. Privatization
may  have  been desirable  in its own  right,  but it is suspicious  when  it increases  during  times of
constrained  public debt.
Another  form of asset decumulation  during  adjustment  programs  is production  of crude
oil,  which  reduces  the country's  asset of oil reserves  in the ground.  It makes  no sense  to compare
oil production  across countries,  so I instead  compare  oil  production  across  time within  countries.  I
use the  timing of IMF standby  loans  as the clearest  signal  of the  timing  of fiscal squeezes,  and then
investigate  if crude  oil production  increases  during  fiscal  squeezes. I exclude  transition  countries
in Eastem Europe  and the Former  Soviet  Union,  whose  oil sectors  were bound  up with the  general
output  decline. I also exclude  countries  with  trivial  amounts  of oil production  (I arbitrarily  set the
cutoff  at 1000  tons of production  per year),  since  it matters little  what happens  to oil production  in17
such cases. I have 18 cases of countries  that received  IMF standby  loans during 1987-96  and
produced  more  than 1000  tons of oil  per year during  that period.  I find that in 13 of the 18 cases,
oil production  was higher  during  the IMF standby  loan  compared  to the periods  without  IMF
standby  loans. Using  a simple  non-parametric  signs  test, I can reject  the hypothesis  that there was
no difference  in oil production  during  periods  with and without  standby  loans at a .015 significance
level. 27 The  median  increase  in production  in the 13 cases where  crude  oil production  increased  was
7 percent,  and ranged  as high as 31 percent  (Venezuela).
3.4 Revenue  and expenditure  shifting
By shifting  revenues  forward  and postponing  expenditures  during  an adjustment  program,
the government  reduces  the deficit  today at the cost of higher  deficits  in the future. (This  would
mean  that permanent  deficit  constraints  would  eventually  bite for the case of pure shifting  of
revenue  and expenditure.  Temporary  deficit  constraints,  like  those during  an IMF-World  Bank
program,  will  tend  to shift deficits  into non-program  periods.  Even  permanent  deficit  constraints
can be evaded  by running  down  assets  and running  up implicit  instead  of explicit  liabilities,  as in
the theoretical  model.)
We can test this notion  of temporariness  by examining  the degree  of trend reversion  in
fiscal deficit  series  vis a vis the strength  of the trend during  the adjustment  period. I specify  a
simple  error correction  model.  First, I regress  the fiscal  deficit  as percent  of GDP for each country
on a time trend:
(10)DFt=a+b*t
Then  I regress  this equation  in first differences  plus an error correction  term that is the residual
from (10),  i.e. the difference  between  the actual  value Dt and the fitted  trend  value from (10) DF,
(11)  Dt+i-Dt  = b + c*(Dt-  DFJ)
The constant  in this equation  (b) is a measure  of the trend  change  per year, while  the coefficient  on
the deviation  of the actual  deficit  (Dt)  from  the trend deficit  (DFt)  captures  the degree  of trend18
reversion. We can  think  of the trend  change  as the long run change  in the budget  deficit  during  the
adjustment  period,  while  the mean  reversion  term measures  how  much  the change  in deficit  was
temporary.  The  sample  of countries  consists  of  38 recipients  of adjustment  loans  that have
complete  data on consolidated  public sector  deficits.
The results are striking.  Only  one country  (Bangladesh)  shows  a long run fiscal  trend
improvement  over 1980-92,  as indicated  by the constant  term b being  statistically  significant.  For
the other  37 countries,  there is no evidence  for a long-run  trend in the deficit. By contrast,  the
coefficients  on the error-correction  term (c) are significant  in 26 out of the 38 countries. The
median  coefficient  on the error correction  term is -.81, indicating  that 81 percent  of a fiscal
28 improvement  is reversed  the following  year for a typical  recipient  of adjustment  lending.
4. Testing  the model's  predictions  on  Euro countries
The  countries  subscribing  to the Stability  Pact of the Maastricht  Treaty have  their budget
deficits  constrained  at 3 percent  of GDP and their gross public  debt constrained  at 60 percent of
GDP (albeit  with some  loopholes). 29 These  constraints  were  particularly  biting  as the May 1998
selection  of countries  eligible  to join the Euro monetary  union approached.  They  thus provide
another  natural experiment  of the effect  of outside  constraints  on deficits  and debt.  The  Maastricht
Euro countries  indeed  show  signs  of reducing  their asset accumulation  and increasing  hidden
liability  accumulation.  Although  sales of financial  assets  like reserves  or equity  do not reduce  the
budget  deficit,  the proceeds  can be used to reduce  the gross public  debt. Reduction  of public
nonfinancial  investment  does reduce  the deficit.
4.1 Examples  of illusory  fiscal  adjustments
I have  first anecdotes  of illusory  fiscal  adjustments.  Buiter  et al. 1993  note about
Maastricht  (which  disallowed  applying  privatization  receipts  to deficits  but did allow  applying
them  to reduce  debt)  that19
Maastricht  encourages  financial  engineering  to avoid  underlying  real  fiscal  adjustment.  Even  when
privatization  is desirable  for  efficiency  reasons,  it is bad economic  policy  to do  the  right  (structural)  thing
for  the  wrong  (financing)  reasons.  (p. 73)
Greece,  which  did not yet  make  it as a Euro country  but is trying  hard to become  one,
announced  in 1998  plans  to privatize  11 state enterprises  and 3 -4 state banks.  Among  the
enterprises  were such  potentially  profitable  companies  as Hellenic  Telecommunications
Organization,  Hellenic  Petroleum,  Water Supply  Co., and two subsidiaries  of Olympic  Airways.
Revenue  from the Greek  privatizations  is expected  to total 0.8-0.9  percent  of GDP in 1998-99.3o
The expected  revenue  will likely  be exceeded  because  of recent sales  of shares  in the National  Bank
of Greece. 31
Belgium  was even  less subtle,  selling  $2.5 billion  worth of gold reserves  on March 19,
1998.  The  government  used the proceeds  to reduce  public debt  by 1 percentage  point  of GDP. 32
Sales of mobile  phone  licenses  also brought  revenue  that could  be applied  to lower both deficit  and
debt.
France  used a more  intricate  device.  France  Telecom  made a one-time  payment  to the
government  of 0.5 percent  of GDP in return  for the government  shouldering  its pension  liabilities
(this corresponds  exactly  in the model  to ALi).  The proceeds  reduced  the deficit  according  to a
European  Commission  ruling,  while  the future  pension  liabilities  of the government  did not show
up in government  debt.  This conjuring  trick accounted  for half of France's deficit  reduction  in
1997.33 One skeptic  noted  that "the  French  budget  process  suggests  that interpretive  flexibility  is
simply  being shifted  from the Maastricht  criteria  to national  accounting  practices."34
Like France,  Austria  got a one-time  payment  from a state enterprise  (the  Postsparkasse)  in
return  for assuming  pension  liabilities.  35 Like  Belgium,  other  temporary  Austrian  revenues  came
from sales of mobile  phone  licenses.  Austria  used a further  sleight  of hand in breaking  out from the
budget  state enterprises  that had substantial  debts.  For example,  the Asfinag  agency  that supervises
road construction  was reclassified  from the government  sector  to the corporate  sector. 3620
Italy used a more  transparent  device:  it levied  a one-time  Eurotax  to meet  the Maastricht
deficit  target in 1997.  It announced  that 60 percent  of this tax would  be refunded  in 1999.37  The
buclget  plan also foresees  a reduction  in debt levels  using  proceeds  from privatizing  the highway
management  network  Autostrade  and the airline  Alitalia. 38
Even  the conservative  Genmans  engaged  in some  illusory  fiscal  adjustments.  The Germans
reclassified  public hospitals  into  the corporate  sector  in 1997,  and so their debts  were  taken out of
the general  government  debt. 39 The  Germans  delayed  interest  payments  on the public debt  to lower
the 1997  deficit.  The  Germans  also accelerated  sales  of shares  in Deutche  Telekom  and used
central  bank profits from reserve  revaluation  to pay off debt  inherited  from  East Germany.40
Eichengreen  and Wyplosz' (1998)  summary  of the Maastricht  adjustment  process  is on the
mark:
European  govermnents  have  relied  on one-off  measures  - central  bank  sales  of gold,  refundable  euro
taxes,  appropriation  for  the  general  budget  of  public  enterprise  reserves,  and sales  of  strategic  petroleum
reserves  -- to meet  the  Maastricht  fiscal  criteria  for 1997.
4.2 Growth  of eovemment  consumption
I follow  the same  procedure  that I used  with the IMF stand-by  group  for the Euro II
(actually  10 because  I lack data on unified  Germany).  I first use the Hodrick-Prescott  filter  to
separate  out the long-run  component  of govermment  consumption.  Then  I compare  the growth  rate
of the smoothed  government  consumption  in the five  years before  Maastricht  (1986-91)  to the five
years after Maastricht  (1991-1996).  The results are surprising:  all of the 10  have higher
consumption  growth  after Maastricht  than before  Maastricht.  However,  the difference  is
quantitatively  trivial (an average  of .09 percentage  points). There  are trend  breaks downward  in
tihe  Hodrick-Prescott  smoothed  series,  but they  come  long  before  Maastricht.
4.3 Privatization  with a control  group
I looked  at privatization  revenues  before  and after  the Maastricht  treaty for the 11
countries  adopting  the Euro (Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,21
Luxembourg,  the Netherlands,  Portugal,  and Spain). As a control  group for what was happening
in privatization  in the absence  of trying  to join the Euro club,  I also look at privatization  revenue  in
3 EU members  who  did not want  to participate  in the Euro (UK, Sweden,  Demnark).  The stability
pact and its sanctions  applied  only  to countries  joining  the Euro currency  union,  not to all EU
countries  (Eichengreen  and Wyplosz  (1998),  p. 71). Figure 3 shows  privatization  in the Euro and
non-Euro  countries  before  and after the signing  of the Maastricht  treaty that specified  the deficit
and debt  targets. The Euro countries  more  than quadrupled  their annual  privatization  revenue  after
Maastricht,  while  privatization  revenue  actually  fell after Maastricht  in the non-Euro  countries.
4.4 Public  investment
Figure  4 shows  what  happened  to public  investment  spending  in the aftermath  of
Maastricht.  Seven  of the Euro countries  reduced  public  investment  as a percent  of GDP,  two left it
unchanged,  and only  two increased  it. By way of contrast,  two of the three  non-Euro  European
countries  increased  public  investment.  The  two Euro countries  that left public investment
unchanged  (Belgium  and Ireland)  and a third  that reduced  it only  slightly  (the  Netherlands)  may
have  done so because  they  had already  reached  rock bottom  public investment.  Belgium,  Ireland,
and the Netherlands  had cut public  investment  in half in a previous  round  of fiscal retrenchment. 4'
By 1997,  public  investment/GDP  was at or within  .1 percent  of GDP of its historic  low in seven
out of the Euro eleven.
4.5 Pension  liabilities
The gross debt  target set in the Maastricht  treaty did not include  contingent  liabilities  such
as pension  obligations.  The implicit  pension  debt  can be defined  as the net present  value of benefits
minus  contributions.  Although  estimating  the net present  value  of the current  scheme  of pension
contributions  and expenditures  is sensitive  to many  assumptions,  most calculations  show  the
implicit  pension  debt in European  countries  to be large. Table 1 summarizes  some  estimates  of the
implicit  pension  debt in the Euro countries  as compared  to explicit  public  debt. 4222
Table 1: Implicit  pension  debt of Euro countries
Country  Gross  government  debt end-  Implicitpension  debt as
1995  as percentage  ratio to  percentage  ratio to 1994 GDP
1995 GDP
Austria  69  93
Belgium  133  153
Finland  59  65
France  53  102
Germany  58  62
Ireland  85  18
Italy  125  60
Netherlands  79  53
Portugal  72  109
Spain  66  109
Source:  Kopits (1997,  p. 18); original  source  for implicit  pension debt is Roseveare  et al. (1996,
pp. 15-16)
We see that net pension  liabilities  are large relative  to the gross government  debt  targeted  by the
convergence  criterion  - seven  of the ten countries  have  higher  implicit  pension  liabilities  than
explicit  government  debt.  The distribution  does  not match  that of explicit  debt.  While  much-
maligned  Italy has the second  highest  explicit  debt/GDP  ratio, it has the third  lowest  implicit
pension  debt.  While  implicit  pension  liabilities  are not the same  as explicit  debt  -because
governments  can change  them  by increasing  contribution  rates or by decreasing  benefits  - they are
a measure  of the fiscal  changes  govermnents  wil have  to make.
4.6 Maastricht summary
The combination  of basically  unchanged  consumption  growth,  one-off  measures,
privatization,  and  public investment  reduction  suggests  that at least part of the fiscal adjustment  in
response  to Maastricht  was illusory.  They  could  be a sign  that the rest of the fiscal adjustment
included  less observable  illusory  actions.  The high implicit  pension  debt suggests  in any case  that
the constraint  on gross government  debt  was addressing  only part of the Euro countries'  future
iscal problems.
5. Conclusions23
There  is a large  literature  on the net  worth definition  of the deficit.  The  literature  has
clanfied  why  the change  in public sector  net worth  is the appropriate  measure  of the deficit,  but
practitioners  do not use the net worth  definition  because  of measurement  difficulties.
The  innovation  of this paper is to use the change  in net worth  definition  of the deficit
positively  rather  than normatively.  I use it to predict  how  the government  will behave  when  faced
with a constraint  on its conventional  deficit.  The  prediction  is that a govermment  forced  to reduce
its deficit  (i.e. its debt  accumulation)  will  reduce  its asset accumulation  or increase  its hidden
liability  accumulation  by an equal  amount.  The government  will leave  the (true)  net worth
definition  of the deficit  unchanged.  If the prediction  is right,  then conventional  fiscal adjustment  is
an illusion.  The net worth  definition  of the deficit  will only  improve  if the government  has a change
of heart that places  more  value  on future consumption  relative  to present  consumption.
Anecdotes  and empirical  results  confirn that asset decumulation  , hidden  liability
accumulation,  and revenue/expenditure  shifting  takes place during  Fund/Bank  fiscal adjustment
programs  in a sample  of developing  countries.  The Euro 11  countries  in Europe  also show signs  of
adjustment  illusion.
The  policy  implications  of this finding  are that outside  agents  like  the EU, IMF, and the
World  Bank should  scrutinize  expenditures  during  adjustment  programs  for signs  of asset
decumulation  or hidden  liability  accumulation.  Such signs  are like  those documented  in this paper -
-cuts in public investments,  cuts in operations  and maintenance,  fiscally  motivated  privatization,
expenditure  or revenue  shifting  over time,  high pension  liabilities  despite  current  pension  surpluses,
shifting  expenditure  and debt off-budget.
The  Interim  Committee  of the Bank and the Fund already  showed  some  awareness  of these
issues  by calling  in its 1996  mneetings  for actions  "to enhance  the transparency  of fiscal  policy  by
persevering  with efforts  to reduce  off-budget  transactions  and quasi-fiscal  deficits"  (Kopits and
Craig 1998).  International  financial  institutions  should  select  which  countries  should  receive24
adjustment  loans on the basis of indicators  that reveal  whether  a given  government  is a low
discount  rate government.
Likewise,  the stability  pact of the Maastricht  countries  should  require  monitoring  of
indicators  of asset decumulation,  hidden  liability  accumulation,  and other  fonns of fiscal illusion.
EU policymakers  should  redo the Maastricht  debt criterion  in terms of debt  net of marketable
assets rather  than gross debt,  so as to eliminate  the  temptation  to engage  in illusory  improvements
from simultaneous  reduction  of assets  and liabilities.  The deficit  target should  be the structural
deficit  -- excluding  cyclical  fluctuations  and one-off  maneuvers.  EU policymakers  should  also pay
as much  attention  to the implicit  pension  debt of the Maastricht  countries  as they do to their
explicit  government  debt.
The example  of New  Zealand  shows  that a low discount  rate government  can try to bind its
own  hands  with accrual  and balance  sheet  accounting.  As one of the architects  of the New  Zealand
reforms  put it, "the  balance  sheet  ... can  provide  an indicator  of whether  the Governnent  is running
down  its estate in order  to maintain  current  consumption"  (Scott 1996,  p. 66).
There is a hierarchy  of possible  public sector  balance  sheets  that can be constructed  in
practice.  The ideal  that I have  had in mind  in this paper would  include  all public sector  assets -
such  as infrastructure,  the present  value  of tax receipts,  the market  value of state-owned  mineral
reserves,  and the market  value  of state enterprises.  It would  include  all liabilities  such as the
official  public debt,  the implicit  pension  debt,  the expected  value  of banking  or state enterprise
bailouts,  and the off-budget  debt. This comprehensive  net  worth measure  would  be a true indicator
of long-run  fiscal  stance.  The second-best  would  be a purely  financial  balance  sheet,  in which  all
matrketable  financial  assets  are listed  in addition  to financial  liabilities.  This would  yield  a number
like "net  financial  assets" or "net financial  debt."  However,  the value  of marketable  assets would
be hard to measure  prior to their being  offered  on the market;  nor would  a purely  financial  balance
sheet  prevent  all of the abuses  documented  in this paper. The third-  best position  is to try to25
estimate  the change  in whatever  can be measured  in the comprehensive  balance  sheet  by
monitoring  all asset sales and changes  in asset accumulation  and all new liability  accumulation,
implicit  or explicit,  certain  or contingent.  This third-best  solution  should  be a minimum  for
external  agents  like  the EU for Euro countries,  and the IMF and World  Bank for developing
countries.
However  it is done,  more comprehensive  monitoring  of the public sector's  assets and
liabilities  would  help ensure  that fiscal adjustment  is the real  thing and not an illusion.26
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govermments  will act in ways  that hide the burden  of taxation  and magnify  the apparent  benefits  of public spending.
This hypothesis  was first proposed  in 1903  by Puviani  (1973)  and later populaized by Buchanan  (1960,  p.60). I am
indebted  to Kopits and Craig (1998)  for  the Puviani  reference  and many  other  useful references.
2Another variant  of measuring  the government's  intertemporal  position  is the "Generational  Accounting"  proposed
by Kotlikoff(1993),  and Auerbach,  Gokhale,  and Kotlikoff  (1993),  which seems  to have  even more  formidable  data
requirements  than the change  in net worth deficit.  The arment  of this paper could be reformulated  in terms of
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generations  and responds  to any demand  for fiscal  retrenchment  by lowering  the deficit  while leaving  the
intergenerational  transfer  unchanged.
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Maastricht  debtlGDP  target. The  net worth  definition  of the deficit  would  treat privatization  receipts  as financing  and
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4Ruppert 1998,  p. Al9
5 For an early  and prescient  treatment  of the problems  with  fiscal rules such as Gramm-Rudman,  see  Hanushek  1986.
6White and Wildavsky  1989,  p. 514
7 Sheffrin  1987,  p. 54
8Eisrier  1986,  Kee 1987,  p. 19
9  Virtually  all commonly-used  deficit  definitions  treat public  investment  as expenditure  rather than as below  the line
asset accumulation.
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investment  in infrastructure,  reducing  overall  public  spending.  However,  to attract  the private  investment,  the
goverment often  offers implicit  or explicit  guarantees  that may create  a future fiscal  burden  greater  than the initial
public spending  reduction.  For example,  in the late 1980s  and early 1990s,  Mexico  franchised  out private
construction  and operation  of about 5000  kilometers  of highways.  When  anticipated  demand  failed to materialize,
many franchise  operators  faced  financial  ruin. The government  gave  more  than $6 billion in subsidies  to save  the
operators  from bankruptcy  (p. 93,  Engel et al 1997).
"  Alesina  and Perotti 1995  found  that deficit  adjustments  made  by cutting  consumption  were more lasting  than those
reduced  in other  ways,  which is in accordance  with  the argument  of this section.
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a mixture of cash and accrual  accounting.  When  arrears become  a serious  problem,  the conventional  approach  to
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3 Wlbite  and Wildavsky  1989,  p. 514.
14Gold  1983,  quoted  in Poterba 1994.  Alesina  and Bayoumi  1996  find  that balanced  budget  rules in US states do
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states reaches  similar  findings  (see survey  in Inman  1996).  However,  this literature  does not address  the question  of
how  the deficits  were reduced,  leaving  open the possibility  that the deficit  reductions  did not improve  net worth.
15 See Polackova  1998  on Thailand,  China,  Malaysia,  and Korea.  A banking  crisis is but one example  of how the
government  can comply  with a ceiling  on visible  liability  accumulation  (debt)  by switching  to hidden liability
accumulation.  For an insightful  treatnent of different  kinds of government  liabilities  (implicit and explicit,
contingent  and noncontingent),  see Polackova  1998.  For example,  the government  could  switch  from granting
subsidies  to state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  to guaranteeing  the bank loans  made  to SOEs  to cover  their losses. This
crea¶tes  the appearance  of a deficit  reduction  but leaves  unchanged  the net worth definition  of the deficit.  When  the
SOEs  eventually  default  on their debt,  the government  pays off  the debt and so winds  up paying  for SOE  losses  just
as it had been when subsidies  were explicit. Egypt, for example,  phased  out budgetary  support  to SOEs  in 1991,  but
allowed  loss-making  SOEs  to continue  to operate  on overdrafts  and foreign  loans.  The  Egyptian  government
periodically  writes off  the domestic  debt of these enterprises.  (World  Bank 1995,  p. 84). The  US Congress  followed  a
similar  stratagem  in the Gramm-Rudman  era It cut direct  loans  by $50 billion  (which shows  up as expenditure
according  to US budget  methodology)  but increased  loan guarantees  by $178  billion,  which do not show  up in the
budget (Rubin  1997,  p. 159)31
'6Pension  reserves  are also  used to cover  health costs of workers  covered  by social  insurance  programs.  This further
depletes  the reserves.  The Venezuelan  government  invested  between  10 and 30 percent of pension  reserves  in the
hospitals  of the social  secunty  system.  In Ecuador,  there was similar  cross-subsidization  of health programs  with
pension  surpluses.  Now these  governments  must face  the rising  expenditures  on both health and pensions  as the
population  ages with  a depleted  pension  reserve  fund (World  Bank 1994b,  p. 47).
7The  Government  Finance  Statistics  Manuals  of the IMF  (1986, 1996a)  treat social  security  taxes as revenue  and
social security  spending  as expenditure.
18  Borrowing  by off-budget  agencies,  whose  debt the government  guarantees,  is another  way  to accumulate  hidden
liabilities.  An example  comes  from the Czech  Republic,  which international  financial  institutions  have praised  for its
fiscal  rectitude.  However,  in April 1998,  the government  announced  that off-budget  state agencies  had accumulated
debt equal  to 13 percent  of GDP  (World  Bank staff  estimate  by Hana Polackova,  email to me of June 1998).  The  US
government  created  S  new off-budget  enterprises  during the Granmu-Rudman  era 1985-89,  while it had only  created  1
such entity  in the previous  13 years  (Rubin 1997,  p. 202). Sinilar examples  come  from  the literature on  US states
that are subject  to debt ceilings.  Von  Hagen 1991  finds  that debt ceilings  on states simply  induce  substitution  of
nonrestricted  debt instruments  for  the restricted  ones. Bunch 1991  finds  that constitutional  debt limits are associated
with the creation  of off-budget  public authorities  that are exempt  from the debt limits.
's A notable optimizing  model of government  creative  accounting  in the face of deficit  and debt constraints  is Milesi-
Ferretti 1998.
20One  reason  there may be a high  discount  rate is that the government  does not expect  to stay in power  very  long.
Blanchard  and Fischer 1989 show  in a continuous  time  OLG  model  that the higher  the probability  of "death", the
lower  will be average  individual  wealth.  In the context  of the present  model,  "death"  means  the end of the
government's  time in power.
21 Other  measures  of the deficit  net out changes  in financial  assets and privatization  receipts,  but still do not net out
all other  assets to get to the net worth  definition  of the deficit.
22See Pritchett 1997.
23  There may be a non-negativity  constraint  on AA  if the govenunent  has no marketable  assets to privatize  and public
gross investment  is of course  constrained  to be positive. However,  virtually  all governments  have positive  public
investment,  implying  that the non-negativity  constraint  is not binding. Moreover,  the government  still has the option
of decumulating  assets by lowering  spending  on O&M  and on complementary  inputs to government  capital.
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Adjustnent  Loans).
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Beetsna and Uhlig 1997,  Eichengreen  and Von  Hagen 1995,  1996,  Holzmann  et al. 1996,  and Buiter  et al. 1993.
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